Now that the 2008 Presidential Primary season has come to a close for both parties, the media, public, and politicians themselves are turning to analysis of the General Election. However, before doing so, it seems appropriate to step back and take stock of the things that the primary season has taught us.
Beginning in December of 2006, we were told that this primary season would be unlike any other. First, there was no incumbent president or vice-president running. Second, the campaign season began earlier than ever before. Third, the frontloaded primary schedule seemed to indicate that both party’s nominees would be decided by Super Tuesday. Finally, the quantity of money involved promised to be greater than ever before. Not knowing what was going to happen, analysts batted around a number of theories about how the primaries would turn out. Let’s analyze one of them now.
Question: With the new, frontloaded primary system, how much should candidates concentrate on the traditional states of Iowa, New Hampshire, and to a lesser extent, South Carolina?
Theories:
There were a number of these. Primarily, they can be divided into two camps. One school of thought held that Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina would take on increasing importance in the abbreviated system. The other school of thought held that importance would be diffused to the larger states voting on and just before Super Tuesday i.e. Florida, California, New York.
When we examine the candidates, we find that they were divided almost in half. For instance, John Edwards and Mike Huckabee developed early on as one trick ponies, basing their support almost entirely in Iowa. They were betting that the bounce from an Iowa win would propel them all the way to Super Tuesday. For Mike Huckabee, this theory seems to have been correct, although not in the way he anticipated. It wasn’t his win per se that catapulted him. Rather, it was the increasing media coverage of his campaign that resulted from his rise in the polls there. Analyzing data from the Real Clear Politics poll averages, we can clearly see that although Huckabee rose first in Iowa, that prompted him to rise in New Hampshire and other states before the actual Iowa Caucuses. Thus, while the ultimate success of Mike Huckabee is not attributable to the classic Iowa bounce, he ultimately owes his rise to his early success in Iowa. The ability of Iowa thus to elevate Huckabee from the second to first tier seems to vindicate the early state strategy. Edwards, on the other hand, was never able to sufficiently expand his base beyond Iowa, and thus was much less successful than Huckabee.
Rudy Giuliani is typical of the other school of thought. He completely abandoned the Iowa caucuses and the several states voting shortly thereafter in favor of a total campaign blitz on Florida, which was where he wanted to make his last stand. I need not remind readers that this failed utterly. But why did this fail? Giuliani was banking on no clear frontrunner emerging from the early primaries. Best case scenario, each of his four main challengers would have won at least one state by the time Florida voted, leaving a disorganized party with ample room to accommodate a win by him. To some extent, this seemed to be the case when Huckabee, McCain, and Romney had all won by the time of South Carolina, which was predicted to be a bloodbath. But here Giuliani miscalculated.
Ideally for him, Thompson would have won South Carolina, destroying McCain and Romney’s momentum and completely throwing the race into disarray. Indeed, Thompson launched a massive bus tour in South Carolina and rose rapidly in the polls in the final days. But then, the worst possible outcome happened. On election day, Thompson and Huckabee split the hard core conservative (read anti-McCain) vote. With Romney abandoning South Carolina in the final days, this left McCain in position to walk away with a narrow victory and the momentum to go on to Florida and unseat Giuliani in his last stand.
Conclusion:
Had Thompson, or even Huckabee, won South Carolina, Giuliani’s strategy may have worked. But they didn’t. Instead, McCain came into Florida with a full head of steam. Since he was the most ideologically similar candidate to Giuliani, he stole many of his votes there and ultimately prevailed.
From this information, we can clearly see that the Huckabee strategy (also practiced by Romney and others) of concentrating on at least one early state was proven superior to the Giuliani strategy. As sad as Giuliani’s miscalculation is, the only sadder thing is that the Clinton campaign did not learn from it. After fighting Obama to a standstill on Super Tuesday, she promised to make her next stand in the far off primaries of Ohio and Texas, more than a month away. Thus, like Giuliani, she failed to contest the next several primaries, several of which (like Wisconsin) were certainly winnable for her. The result: 10 consecutive post-Super Tuesday wins for Obama, and a delegate lead she would never overcome. Those who don’t learn from history…